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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. ', 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE, 
$3,000.00 CASH, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NO. 890245 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2(3)(j)/ Utah Code Annotated/ 1953/ as amended 
1987. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal of the 
plaintifffs Complaint for Forfeiture and the defendant's Reply 
and Coun t e r c 1 a I ins t: t\ e r e t o e n t er ed lby 1: he H<:::>no r ab 1 e D e a n C o n d e r 
sitting for the Honorable J* Phillip Eves in the Fifth District 
Court/ Washington County. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did the Court err in dismissing plaintiff's 
Complaint for Forfeiture and the Answer thereto filed by the 
owner of the property together with the Counterclaims? 
II. Were the counterclaims of Andrew Lewis Taylor 
properly brought in the forfeiture action? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitution of State of Utah/ Art. 1/ § 11 
All courts shall be open
 r an(3 every person / £or an In jury done to 
him in his person/ property or reputation/ shall have remedy by 
due course of law/ which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State/ by himself or 
counsel/ any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 8(c) 
Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading/ a 
party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction/ 
arbitration and award/ assumption of risk/ contributory negli-
gence/ discharge in bankruptcy/ duress estopped failure of 
consideration/ fraud/ illegality/ injury by fellow servant/ 
laches/ license/ payment release/ res judicata/ statute of 
frauds/ statute of linmitations/ waiver/ and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party 
has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense/ the court on terms/ if justice so 
requires/ shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper 
designation. 
Rule 8(f) 
Construction of Pleadings. All Pleadings shall be so construed 
as to do substantial justice. 
Rule 12(b) 
See Addendum 10 
Rule 12(h) 
See Addendum 11 
Rule 13(a) 
See Addendum 12 
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Rule 15(a) 
See Addendum 13 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case/ Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
The claimant of the property/ counterclaimant and 
appellant Andrew Lewis Taylor was stopped on the Freeway in 
Washington County by Utah Highway Patrolmen. His vehicle was 
subsequently impounded when the officers discovered contraband 
and arrested the defendant. His vehicle and cash were taken from 
him and a Complaint for the forfeiture of the vehicle was filed 
by the State of Utah on September 3/ 1987. An Answer and 
Counterclaim was filed to the Complaint for Forfeiture on October 
10/ 1987. 
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their Petition for 
Forfeiture on April 25/ 1988. That motion was not noticed for 
hearing until May 9f 1988/ and was never renoticed after that 
date. On January 11/ 1989/ D. Michael Carter/ Deputy Attorney 
General filed an Appearance of Counsel also on behalf of 
plaintiff. On February 14, 1989/ counsel for the State filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and requested oral argument/ 
which motion was pursuant to a scheduling conference set for 
April 20/ 1989. At the scheduling conference on April 20/ Judge 
Conder appeared sitting for Judge Eves and entered an order 
granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss which was not set for 
hearing on that day and dismissed defendant and appellant's 
answer and all counterclaims. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 28/ 1987/ a 1983 Oldsmobile Royale and 
$3/000.00 in cash were taken from Andrew Lewis Taylor by 
troopers/ employees of the Utah Highway Patrol/ State of Utah. 
Subsequently/ on September 3/ 1987/ a Complaint for Forfeiture of 
Property was filed by the Deputy Washington County Attorney 
requesting pursuant to section 58-37-13/ Utah Code Annotated 
1958/ that the property be forfeited to the State of Utah. The 
Complaint for Forfeiture was personally served together with a 
Summons/ copies of each of which are attached hereto/ marked 
Addendum 1 and incorporated herein by reference/ on Andrew Lewis 
Taylor on or about September 15/ 1987. Said Andrew Lewis Taylor/ 
through counsel answered the Complaint for Forfeiture as required 
by the Summons and filed certain counterclaims/ a copy of said 
answer and counterclaim are attached hereto marked Addendum 2 and 
incorporated herein by reference. The plaintiff's Answer (Reply) 
to Andrew Lewis Taylor's Counterclaim was filed on November 3/ 
1987/ a copy of which is attached hereto marked Addendum 3 and 
incorporated herein by reference. On April 25/ 1988/ plaintiff 
filed a Motion to Dismiss/ a copy of which is attached hereto 
marked Addendum 4 and incorporated herein by reference. On May 
26/ 1988/ the property owner Andrew Lewis Taylor filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment/ a copy of which is attached hereto marked 
Addendum 5 and incorporated herein by reference. The Motion to 
Dismiss and Andrew Lewis Taylorfs Motion For Summary Judgment 
were brought before the Honorable Phillip Eves in Chambers on 
June 6/ 1988/ however/ no legal ruling was made thereon/ the 
Court requesting that counsel include as attorneys for plaintiff 
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someone from the Office of the Attorney General/ State of Utah. 
On January 11/ 1989/ D. Michael Carter/ Assistant 
Attorney General for the State of Utah entered an appearance on 
behalf of plaintiff. On February 14/ 1989/ a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment/ Request for Oral Argument and Notice of Hearing 
was filed by D. Michael Carter on behalf of plaintiff/ a copy of 
which is attached hereto marked Addendum 6 and incorporated 
herein by reference. A telephonic scheduling conference was held 
on December 22/ 1988/ and a Scheduling Order/ a copy of which is 
attached hereto marked Addendum 7 and incorporated herein by 
reference/ was issued thereafter. On March 14/ 1989/ a Notice of 
Hearing was filed by the Deputy Washington County Attorney 
scheduling plaintifffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/ 
Request for Oral Argument for April 20/ 1989/ a copy of which is 
attached hereto marked Addendum 8 and incorporated herein by 
reference. In the Scheduling Order/ a pretrial was scheduled for 
April 20/ and trial for May 9, 1989. 
At the pretrial on the 20th day of April/ the only 
legal matter noticed for argument and stipulated to by counsel 
was the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the 
parties appeared on April 20/ before Judge Conder/ sitting for 
Judge Eves. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and defendant and 
owner of the property's Motion for Summary Judgment were not 
noticed for hearing and were not before the Court on April 20/ 
1989. At said hearing/ the court apparently concluded that 
Andrew Lewis Taylor was not a party to the action (see colloquy 
between Court and counsel/ Transcript/ pages 2, 3/ and 4/ copies 
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attached hereto marked Addendum 9 and incorporated herein by 
reference). In the discussion surrounding plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment/ the Court apparently concluded an 
interpleader should be filed by Andrew Lewis Taylor and then the 
Court moved from its discussion of the interpleader/ and opened 
the question of the Motion to Dismiss/ which was not before the 
Court (Transcript/ pages 9, 10/ and 11). Counsel for Mr. Taylor 
then asked the Court to allow him two days within which to file 
an interpleader (Transcript/ page 12)/ and again requested the 
interpleader in the face of what appeared to be an imminent 
adverse ruling (Transcript/ page 15)/ and the Court did not rule 
on counsel's request to interplead except by implication in his 
refusal to grant the interpleader evidenced by the Order of 
Dismissal. The court indicated that it could not rule on 
plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Transcript/ page 
18)/ and subsequently reiterated that the mistake in filing of 
the forfeiture action by plaintiff did not justify summary 
judgment (Transcript/ page 19). However/ in dismissing the 
action including the counterclaims/ the Court/ in effect/ granted 
a summary judgment/ although the Court throughout the transcript 
in discussion took pains to point out it was not making any 
decisions or issuing any rulings on the legal issues raised by 
plaintiff's motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The counterclaimant Andrew Lewis Taylor urges that 
the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint over his objection and the 
dismissal of his counterclaims filed in response to the petition 
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of forfeiture were error. Andrew Lewis Taylor submits that the 
Court could not pursuant to the applicable Rules of Procedure in 
this State fail either to allow him to amend his pleadings (Rule 
15a) to "interplead" if the Court thought that was necessary/ or 
to leave the counterclaims pending for determination as required 
by the Rules 41(2) if the petition of plaintiff was dismissed. 
In dismissing plaintiff's petition and defendant's counterclaims/ 
the defendant has been denied his opportunity to litigate these 
claims and denied his right to access to the courts under the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
2. The counterclaimant/appellant Andrew Lewis Taylor 
was served with a summons and complaint for forfeiture of his 
property. He answered the summons and complaint pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserted four counterclaims. 
Although the complaint for forfeiture did not ask for the 
forfeiture of cash seized by the State of Utah agents/ the 
counterclaims of the counterclaimant Andrew Lewis Taylor 
requested not only the return of his automobile but also the 
return of his money/ or in the alternative/ the value of each 
together with the value of the loss of use of each. The District 
Court did not reach the issue of whether the counterclaimant/ 
appellant had "standing" nor did it reach the issue as to the 
legitimacy and propriety of the counterclaims. Under the 
circumstances/ the counmterclaimant believes and urges that the 
counterclaims were properly brought pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and that they could not be dismissed without a 
legal determination thereon. 
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ARGUMENT 
"POINT I 
The Court improperly dismissed plaintifffs complaint 
over the objection of the owner Andrew Lewis Taylor. Rule 41(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissal of actions 
by order of the court as follows: 
Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdi-
vision of this rule# an action shall not be dismissed 
at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the 
court and upon such terms and conditions as the Court 
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plain-
tiff's motion to dismiss/ the action shall not be 
dismissed aginst the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjud-
ication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in 
the order a dismissal under this paragraph is without 
prejudice. 
It is clear that in not ruling on the counterclaims and 
failing to retain those claims pending for independent adjud-
ication by the Court/ the dismissal was improper. Further/ while 
implicit in the argument of the plaintiff and observations 
thereto by the Court that "standing" was questioned/ the failure 
to allow the responding party/ Andrew Lewsis Taylor/ an oppor-
tunity to remedy those procedural deficiencies perceived by the 
Court in a reasonable period of time was an abuse of discretion/ 
and/ in so doing/ the Court violated Rule 8(f)/ "all pleadings 
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice"/ of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which latter rule states in relevant 
part: 
a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of Court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
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The question of "standing" should not be considered by 
this Court for two reasons. First/ neither Andrew Lewis Taylor's 
claims/ nor the motion of plaintiff/ wherein "standing" is first 
mentioned were expressly ruled on in the District Court. While 
the Court indicated it was not passing on any of the legal 
matters and not granting any summary judgment/ it nevertheless in 
its dismissal invalidated/ cancelled/ or otherwise precluded the 
counterclaims of Andrew Lewis Taylor from being asserted. And in 
so doing/ the Court has/ in effect/ granted a summary judgment on 
a basis which is not clear from its ruling/ but did so contrary 
to its espoused purposes to guaranteed fairness to both sides. 
The Court if in fact it ruled on the "standing" 
question abused its discretion in failing to allow the amendment 
of the pleadings to correct the "standing" issue by the filing of 
an interpleader/ which the Court appeared to have found necessary 
in this action/ Andrew Lewis Taylor asserts/ however/ that an 
interpleader action is not necessary and that in fact he was 
properly before the Court. 
Second/ the District Court made two errors in 
considering the motion to dismiss. Initially it turned to and 
considered a motion not before it and then it acted granting a 
motion seemingly on the basis of "standing"/ which motion was not 
timely. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
a party to set forth affirmatively its defenses "and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." Rule 
12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates the mandate of 
Rule 8 in connection with counterclaims and establishes two 
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options for presenting defenses by motion but requires 
A motion making any of [such] defenses shall be made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted 
and Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure imposes on a 
party a waiver of 
all defenses and objections which he does not present 
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or/ if he has 
made no motion/ in his answer or reply . . . . 
If the district Court in granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss 
relied on one of the exceptions to the above quoted language in 
Rule 12(h), then the basis for its ruling should have been 
specifically identified. 
On November 3/ 1987/ in a pleading which was a Reply 
but designated as an Answer to Andrew Lewis Taylor's Counter-
claims/ no defense or suggestion was made that the said Andrew 
Lewis Taylor lacked "standing" to assert such claims (see 
Addendum 3). The motion to dismiss which the Court considered 
was submitted on the 25th of April/ 1988/ was not timely made in 
accordance with Rules 8 and 12/ and likewise did not raise a 
"standing" issue. Rather/ the untimely filed motion seemed to 
address the jurisdiction of the Court to consider counterclaims 
in a forfeiture action and alleged as a defense the State's being 
absolved from liability for the reason that it divested itself of 
the subject property. Again/ neither postulate was raised timely 
as an "avoidance or affirmative defense". 
Consequently/ while Point 1 of the State's memorandum 
for sumamry disposition addressed "standing"/ that matter was not 
determined by the ruling of the District Court and if it was/ it 
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was considered and determined erroneously. The owner and 
counterclaimant Andrew Lewis Taylor should have been afforded an 
opportunity to correct any deficiencies in his pleadings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
The statutory nature of a forfeiture proceeding does 
not exlcude the subject of forfeiture from asserting legitimate 
counterclaims. The plaintiff sued to forefeit the property of 
Andrew Lewis Taylor/ served Andrew Lewis Taylor with a summons 
and complaint/ and demanded that he answer. These actions were 
taken pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the State of Utah. 
Rules 12 and 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandated 
that all defenses and objections be represented in that lawsuit 
and that all counterclaims be brought as "compulsory" counter-
claims if 
it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and 
does not require for its adjudication the presence of 
third parties of whom the Court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ Rule 13(a). 
The Court in granting the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 
and including therein the claims and defenses of Andrew Lewis 
Taylor deprived the said Andrew Lewis Taylor of the benefit of a 
hearing on his compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13. 
The defendant Andrew Lewis Taylor asserts that he is 
entitled to maintain both the counterclaims and to contest the 
forfeiture action by his answer. The Court denied him relief on 
both grounds. In so doing without ruling on the legal issues 
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raised in plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/ and in 
considering plaintiff's motion to Dismiss/ which was not before 
the Court/ the Court has/ by implication/ ruled that the Rules of 
Procedure do not apply to the statutory forfeiture action and 
such ruling is clearly erroneous. 
The matter was on for a Pretrial Conference/ the legal 
issues being limited to the Partial Summary Judgment Motion of 
plaintiff by stipulation and the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 
was not before the Court. In denying the claimant and owner 
Andrew Lewis Taylor of his right to trial/ or alternatively in 
not making a clear legal ruling on any of the questions raised by 
the motion under consideration and by going beyond what was 
before the Court/ the said Andrwew Lewis Taylor was denied his 
right to trial in violation of Article 1/ Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
If/ in fact/ the determination of the Court below was 
that Andrew Lewis Taylor had no standing to assert the claims he 
made by virtue of filing an interpleader/ the Court abused its 
discretion in not allowing him to assert his claims by such 
interpleader so that the legal issues raised could be considered 
and ruled on appropriately with those parties ruled adversely 
against having the right to present the issues to this Court. 
The muddled ruling of the lower Court denied the claimant and 
owner of the vehicle his opportunity to have the matters raised 
by his responsive pleading/ which responsive pleading was 
demanded by the Summons and Complaint served on him/ heard and 
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determined by the Court. The Court in short-circuiting the 
process and failing to properly preserve the counterclaims for 
subsequent dertermination either as a summary judgment matter or 
for trial committed reversible error. 
There was no authority for the District Court to 
consider the 1988 Motion to Dismiss/ the same not being noticed 
for hearing. Even if it had been noticed/ the motion did not 
properly and timely raise an issue which it could be said the 
Court found dispositive. In considering the motion to dismiss 
and granting the same without preserving the counterclaims for a 
subsequent determination of all the legal and procedural issues 
raised by such counterclaims/ the Court failed to provide the 
protection of Article 1/ Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah 
to Andrew Lewis Taylor and denied him his right to a "remedy by 
due course of law which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay". 
WHEREFORE Andrew Lewis Taylor prays the matter be 
summarily reversed by this Court and returned for adjudication on 
the law and merits as justice so requires. 
Dated this day of October/ 1989. 
J. Franklin Allred 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff/ 
-vs-
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE/ 
$3/300,00 CASH/ 
Defendant. 
S U M M O N S 
Civil No, 87-1585 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANDREW LEWIS TAYLOR AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES: 
You are hereby suimoned and required to file an Answer in writing to 
the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court/ and to serve 
upon/ or mail to 0. Brenton Rowe/ Deputy Washington County Attorney/ 220 North 
200 East/ St. George/ Utah 84770/ a copy of said Answer/ within twenty (20) 
days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so/ Judgment by default will be taken against you 
for the relief demand in said Complaint/ which has been filed with the Clerk of 
said Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this of September/ 1987. 
5. BRENTON RCWE 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ADDENDUM 1 
Paul P. Graf #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
0. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Hall of Jus t ice 
220 North 200 East 
St . George/ Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON/ STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff/ 
-vs-
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE/ 
$3/300.00 CASH, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE AND 
INTENT TO FORFEIT 
Civil No. 87-1585 
TO: ANDREW LEWIS TAYLOR 
Pursuant to UCA 58-37-13/ notice i s hereby given to you tha t one 1983 
Oldsmobile Royale and $3/300.00 Cash has been seized by the Utah Highway 
Patrol / in Washington County/ State of Utah/ on the 28th day of January/ 1987/ 
and that the State of Utah intends to commence proceedings to have a l l of your 
r igh t / t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in said property forfei ted to the Department of 
Finance. 
7/J DATED th i s 3 day of September/ 1987. 
/^(tnO^J^Z AzJ^ 
0. BRENTON ROWE 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
R E T U R N O P S E R V I C E 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OP WASHINGTON ) 
I# the undersigned/ hereby c e r t i f y and return that 
I rece ived the attached document on the
 mmmmmmmmmmm day of 
/19 9 and served the same upon 
AndfclQ'/jZlil^ldJA/nr personal ly / by de l iver ing to and 
leaving with above named person in the City of St* George/ 
County of Washington/ State of Utah/ a true copy of the attached 
document/ on the _____ day of , 19 / a t 
^^^^^^^^^ a.nu/p»ro« 
I further c e r t i f y that on the copy of the attached 
document so served/ I endorsed the date and place of s e r v i c e / and 
added my name and o f f i c i a l t i t l e thereof . 
DATED t h i s day of / 19 • 
Paul F. Graf #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
0. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Hall of Justice 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
RFTH JUWC1AL DST COURT 
WA3WN8T0N C«JNTY 
'//•:,',,*,. ..*.. — CLERK 
— DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE, 
$3,300.00 CASH, 
Defendant 
COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE 
OF PROPERTY 
Civil No. ^ ^ -/5~£ ^ f 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through its attorney, 0. 
Brenton Rowe, Deputy Washington County Attorney, and alleges as 
follows: 
1. That the acts alleged herein occurred in Washington 
County, State of Utah. 
2. That this action is being brought pursuant to Section 
58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
3. That the property which is the subject of this action is 
a 1983 Oldsmobile Royale, California license no. 2ABT952, Vin no. 
1G3AY69Y)DX335037. 
4. That the vehicle is owned by Andrew Lewis Taylor, 740 
Ridgehaven, LaHabra, California, 90631. 
5. That on or about the 28th day of January, 1987, Andrew 
Lewis Taylor ped at a. routine roadblock south of St. 
George at approximately 1100 hours. Trooper Brent Dunlap asked 
Mr. Taylor for his drivers license and registration. At this 
time it was noted that the vehicle was registered in another name 
other than the person driving it. Mr. Taylor then produced a 
bill of sale and title for proof. The bill of sale was not 
notarized and did not appear to be an official document. The 
title had been signed off by the registered owner in June of 
1986, but the new owner information had not been filled in. 
Trooper Jim Lloyd asked Mr. Taylor if he could search his 
vehicle. Mr. Taylor agreed and Trooper Lloyd went to get a 
search warrant. When he returned with the Search Warrant, Mr. 
Taylor stated he changed his mind and refused to sign the form. 
The vehicle was subsequently impounded on improper registrations 
without proof of ownership. The vehicle was inventoried and 
$3,300 cash was found in the vehicle. Also found were two purple 
and white sacks containing plastic bags with a white powder in 
them, which was tested and identified as cocaine. One plastic 
bag contained 153.1 grams and the other 138.9 grams. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays that the above-entitled Court 
enter Judgment against Andrew Lewis Taylor pursuant to Section 
58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated, as follows: 
That all right, title and interest in the 1983 Olds Royale, 
California license no. 2ABT952, Vin no. 1G3AY69Y)DX335037 and 
$3,300,00 cash, be forfeited and that the vehicle be delivered to 
the custody of the department of finance for disposal as provided 
in Section 58-37 
-13(8), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, 
DATED this J daY o f September, 1987• 
0. BRENTON ROWE 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
0, BRENTON ROWE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says 
that he has read the foregoing complaint, knows the contents 
thereof, and that the same are true except as to those matters 
which are based upon information and belief and as to those 
matters he believes them to be true. 
^ £ L _ 
0. BRENTON ROWE 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1987. 
^ day of September, 
>^^S 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY /PUBLIC V 
Residing in Washington County 
//-M-&? 
J. Franklin Allred/ P.C./ #A0058 
Attorney for Owner and Counterclaimant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City/ Ut 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff/ 
vs. 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOB1LE ] 
ROYALE/ $3/300.00 CASH/ ) 
Defendant. ] 
) ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 87-1585 
Andrew Lewis Taylor by and through his attorney J. 
Franklin Allred herewith answers the complaint for forfeiture of 
property in the above-entitled case/ the said Andrew Lewis Taylor 
being the rightful owner of all such property as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Owner answers the specific allegations of the 
complaint/ admitting/ alleging and denying as follows: The owner 
admits paragraphs 1/ 2, 3 and 4 of said complaint/ and admits so 
much of paragraph 5 that alleges on the 28th of January he was 
stopped in a roadblock, that he was asked for his license and 
registration/ that he produced a bill of sale and title, which 
bill of sale were valid and legitimate, admits that the title had 
been signed off by the registered owner/ admits that the officers 
requested to search his vehicle/ but denies he ultimately 
consented to such a search; he admits that, he refused to sign a 
consent to search and that the vehicle was subsequently 
impounded/ but denies the suggestion that the stop/ questioning/ 
examination of his documents/ impound and inventory were lawful/ 
they being in actuality an unlawful search and seizure. The 
owner admits that $3/300 cash owned by him and possessed legally 
was in the vehicle and that the vehicle was owned by him and 
legally possessed/ and denies the last sentence of paragraph 5 on 
the basis that he has no knowledge as to the analyses of the 
substances claimed to have been found. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The stop of the owner was unlawful. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
That the detention of the owner of the property was 
unlawful. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
That the seizure of the vehicle and money were the 
fruit of an unlawful search of Mr. Taylor's personal property. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The impoundment and inventory of the automobile were 
unlawful. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
That a previous finding of a district court in this 
State found that the stop/ detention/ search/ and seizure of the 
owner's automobile and money were unlawful/ which decision was 
not appealed/ and it is conclusive as to the illegality of said 
search and dispositive of the right to forfeit the subject 
property* 
WHEREFORE the owner prays that the complaint be 
dismissed no cause of action and that he be awarded his judgment 
in accordance with his counterclaims hereinafter made. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That Andrew Lewis Taylor is the counterclaimant 
herein and as such is the owner of the 1983 Oldsmobile Royale and 
$3/300.00 in cash/ which is the subject-matter of this lawsuit. 
2. That on or about the 28th day of January 1987/ said 
Andrew Lewis Taylor was unlawfully stopped and his vehicle and 
personal belongings were unlawfully searched/ and his vehicle/ 
property/ and cash unlawfully seized by the State of Utah and its 
agents and employees/ James D. Lloyd/ Phillip Barney and others 
whose names are not now known to counterclaimant. 
3. That a previous decision of the above-entitled 
Court ruled conclusively in the favor of the counterclaimant and 
said decision has not been set aside or reversed on appeal/ and 
is not now being appealed/ the time for appeal having expired. 
4. The owner and counterclaimant is entitled to the 
immediate return of his vehicle and $3/300.00 in cash. 
5. That the owner of said vehicle and cash is entitled 
to recover as damages from the plaintiff the reasonable value of 
the use of said vehicle during the entire period for which he has 
been deprived of the same/ together with the reasonable value of 
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the interest on all cash seized until such time as all property 
is returned to hinu 
6. The owner and counterclaimant is entitled to 
recover his costs and attorney's fees herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OP ACTION 
1. The owner and counterclaimant incorporates 
paragraphs 1 through 6 of his first cause of action in this his 
second cause of action. 
2. That the State of Utah has converted and 
missappropriated the vehicle and cash of the counterclaimant. 
3. That the State of Utah has violated the authortiy 
of the statute under which it sues and § 77-23-8 Utah Code 
Annotated by failing to hold and maintain said property subject 
to the order of this Court. 
4. That each of the acts of the State in obtaining and 
disposing of counterclaimant's property was done willfully/ 
maliciously and with an intent to damage the owner and 
counterclaimant/ 
5. That the owner and counterclaimant has been damaged 
by the loss of use of his property and the loss of the value of 
the automobile and the interest value of the money/ and has been 
generally damaged thereby. 
6. That because of the acts of the State of Utah were 
willful/ deliberate and done with an intent to deprive the owner 
and counterclaimant of his property without due process of law 
and absent statutory authorization/ the owner and counterclaimant 
is entitled to recover punitive damages. Or/ in the alternativa.-
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if trial of said issues indicates that the acts of the plaintiff 
State of Utah were only negligent/ then he is entitled to general 
damages. 
7. The owner and counterclaimant is entitled to 
recover his costs and attorney's fees in connection with this his 
second counterclaim. 
THIRD CAUSE OP ACTION 
1. The owner and counterclaimant incorporates 
paragraphs 1 through 6 of of his first cause of action in this 
his third cause of action. 
2. That the plaintiff above-named came into possession 
of a 1983 Oldsmobile Royale and $3/300.00 in cash owned by Andrew 
Lewis Taylor/ and as such became the trustee of a constructive 
trust for the benefit of said Andrew Lewis Taylor. 
3. That the plaintiff above-named violated its 
responsibility as trustee of the constructive trust for the 
safekeeping of the subject property and released said property to 
third persons in violation of the said Andrew Lewis Taylor's 
interest in said property and in violation of the plaintiff's 
obligation as trustee of said constructive trust. 
4. No authority to release any of said property was 
ever given to plaintiff by the owner of said property/ nor by a 
court of this State. 
5. That the acts of the State and its agents and 
employees were done willfully/ deliberately/ and for the purpose 
of damaging the counterclaimant and depriving him of property 
rightfully his. 
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6. That the owner of said property is entitled to 
order of this Court requirng the redelivery of the owner's 
property/ or, in the alternative/ payment of damages for the 
property itself/ for the loss of use and the value thereof/ and 
for attorney's fees and cost in connection with this matter. 
7. That counterclaimant is entitled to recover 
punitive damages. 
FOURTH CAUSE OP ACTION 
1. The owner and counterclaimant incorporates 
paragraphs 1 through 6 of of his first cause of action in this 
his fourth cause of action. 
2. That the State of Utah and its agents and employee 
James D. Lloyd and Phillip Barney acted to violate the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the owner of said property. 
3. That such action was in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-16-1 et seq. 
4. That the actions of the individual employees of the 
State of Utah and the State of Utah were grossly negligent/ or in 
the alternative/ substantial/ willful/ or malicious. 
5. That the counterclaimant has been damaged by the 
loss of his property/ the loss of the use of his property/ the 
loss of the value of his money/ and generally by the substantial/ 
grossly negligent/ willful/ or malicious acts of the State and 
its employees. 
6. That counterclaimant has been damaged by being 
forced to expend attorney's fees to defend himself in State v. 
Taylor. 
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7. That as a result of said acts/ the owner and 
counterclaimant is entitled to recover from the State and its 
individual employees the value of the vehicle and the cash 
together with the value for the loss of use thereof/ together 
with his attorney's fees expended in connection with defending 
the case entitled State v. Taylor/ and for his cost of attorney's 
fees in bringing this action. 
WHEREFORE the owner and counterclaimant prays on his 
first cause of action for the return of his vehicle/ the return 
of his $3/300.00/ for damages equivalent to the value of the 
vehicle for the term of deprivation/ together with damages for 
the money for the term of deprivation/ together with attorney's 
fees and costs/ and general damages all of which in sum aggregate 
$50,000.00. 
On his second cause of action for the return of his 
vehicle/ the return of his money/ damages for the loss of use of 
his vehicle/ for attorney's fees/ costs/ and general damages in 
the aggregate of $50/000.00/ and for punitive damages in the 
amount of $50/000.00. 
On his third cause of action for the return of his 
vehicle/ the return of his money/ damages for the loss of use of 
his vehicle and money/ for attorney's fees/ costs/ and general 
damages in the aggregate of $50/000.00/ and for punitive damages 
in the amount of $50/000.00. 
On his fourth cause of action nominal damage in the 
amount of $100.00/ plus costs and attorney's fees in the sum of 
$25/000.00/ or such additional fee or fees as is deemed 
reasonable by the Court together with punitive or exemplary 
damages in the sum of $25/000.00. 
Dated this k day of October/ 1987. 
J* Franklin Allred 
Attorney for Counterclairaant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Answer and Counterclaim was mailed/ postage prepaid/ 
O. Brenton Rowe 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Washington County Hall of Justice 
220 North 200 East 
St. George/ UT 84770 
David L. Wilkinson 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City/ UT 84114 
Dated this day of October/ 1987. 
J. Franklin Allred "" 
Attorney for Counterclaimant 
PAUL F. GRAF #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
0. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Hall of Justice 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801)634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNT* OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROTALE, ] 
$3,300.00 CASH/ 
Defendant* 
) ANSWER TO ANDREW LEWIS TAYLOR'S 
COUNTERCLAIM 
| Civil No. 87-1585 
COMES NOW State of Utah by and through its attorney/ 0. Brenton Rowe/ 
and answers the Counterclaim of Andrew Lewis Taylor as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Counterclaim fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The property Andrew Lewis Taylor seeks to recover from the State of 
Utah is in the possession of the State of Utah having been surrendered to the 
United States Government/ Drug Enforcement Administration/ which has forfeited 
said property as evidenced by Declarations of Forfeiture attached hereto and 
marked "Exhibit 1*. 
ANSWER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff lacks sufficient information to answer paragraph 1 of 
the First Cause of Action and therefore denies all allegations therein. 
2. Plainti f f denies the allogations in paragraph 2, that the stop/ 
search and seizure was unlawful and admits the remaining allogations of 
paragraph 2 in P la in t i f f ' s First Cause of Action. 
3. Plaintiff admits the allogations contained in paragraph 3 of 
Andrew Lewis Taylor's First Cause of Action. 
4.j Plaintiff denies the allogations contained in paragraph 4, 5, and 
6 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's First Cause of Action. 
ANSWER TO SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff denies the allogations in paragraphs 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ and 
7/ of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Second Cause of Action. 
ANSWER TO THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plainti f f denies the allogations contained in paragraphs 1/ 2, 3/ 4/ 
5 / 6 / and 7 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Third Cause of Action. 
ANSWER TO FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaint i f f denies the allogations contained in paragraphs 1/ 2, 3/ 
4/ 6/ and 7 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Fourth Cause of Action. 
2. Plaint i f f lacks suff ic ient information to admit or deny the 
allogations contained in paragraph 5 of Andrew Lewis Taylor's Fourth Cause of 
Actions/ and therefore denies the allogations contained therein. 
WHEREFORE/ pla int i f f prays the above-entitled Court to dismiss the 
counterclaim of Andrew Lewis Taylor for failure to raise a claim for which 
re l ie f may be granted. /j 
DATED this T day of November/ 1987. 
0. BRENTON RGWE 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this ^/^ day of November/ 1987/ I mailed 
a copy of the above and foregoing Answer to Andrew Lewis Taylor's Counterclaim 
to J, Franklin Allred, Attorney for Owner and Counterclaimant/ 321 South 600 
East/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84102/ and David L. Wilkinson/ Utah Attorney 
General/ 236 State Capitol Building/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84114. 
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DECLARATION OF FORFEITURE 
The above-described property has been seized by agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration pursuant to 21 USC 881. Notice of the 
seizure has been sent to all known parties who may have a legal or 
possessory interest in the property. Also, in accordance with 19 USC 
I607t notice of the seizure has been published and no claim has been 
filed for the property within 20 days from the date of the first 
publication of the advertisement* THEREFORE, it is hereby declared 
that such property is forfeited to the United States pursuant to 
19 USC 1609. 
A - r t e t F o r r e i t u ^ e ^ n \ t 
Office of .Chief Counsel 
cc 
USMS/HQS - N A S A F P V 
DEA-294 (5/87) BI: 
Paul F. Graf #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
0. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Hall of Justice 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ; 
ROYALE, $3,300.00 CASH, 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
) Civil No. 87-1585 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the State of Utah/ by and through 0. Brenton 
Rowe/ Deputy Washington County Attorney/ and moves the above-
entitled Court to dismiss the proceedings/ in the above-entitled 
matter. This motion is based on the grounds and reasons that the 
United States Government Drug Enforcement Administration has seized 
the property subject to this action (see attached Declaration of 
Forfeiture) and the State of Utah is no longer in possession of 
said property/ and has no interest in forfeiture of said property. 
THE PLAINTIFF FURTHER MOVES to dismiss the Defendant's 
counterclaim on the grounds that 58-37-13/ Utah Code Annotated 
1953/ as Amended/ does not provide for filing of counterclaims to 
be filed concerning civil rights violation contained in Defendants 
ADDENDUM 4 
counterclaim which would be more appropriate ly f i l e d as Sect ion 
1983 C i v i l Right ' s act ion in the United S ta te s D i s t r i c t Court. 
DATE D this /$ d ay of April/ 1988. 
fs*-r~n 
O. BRENTON ROME 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this ^ ^ ^ d a y of April/ 1988/ 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing MOTION 
TO DISMISS to J. Franklin Allred, 321 South 600 East/ Salt Lake 
City/ Utah 84102. 
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DECLARATION OF FORFEITURE 
The above-described property has been seized by agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration pursuant to 21 USC 881. Notice of the 
seizure has been sent to all known parties who may have a legal or 
possessory interest in the property. Also, in accordance with 19 USC 
1607, notice of the seizure has been published and no claim has been 
filed for the property within 20 days from the date of the first 
publication of the advertisement. THEREFORE, it is hereby declared 
that such property is forfeited to"the United States pursuant to 
19 USC 1609. 
Office of Chief Counsel 
cc: 
USMS/HQS - NASAFP J) > 
DEA-294 (5/87) BY $T 
J. Franklin Allred/ P.C./ #A0058 
Attorney for Owner and Counterclaimant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/ 1 
vs. 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE 
ROYALE/ $3/300.00 CASH/ ] 
Defendant. 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
1 NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. 87-1585 
Judge Eves 
The owner of the subject property in the above-entitled 
matter/ Andrew Lewis Taylor/ by and through his attorney J. 
Franklin Allred/ hereby moves the Court for an order granting 
summary judgment in the above-entitled case with respect to the 
return of the subject property/ or its value at the time of 
taking^ and for an order setting the general and consequential 
damages for trial on the grounds and for the reasons as follows: 
1. The pleadings on file indicate that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact left to be decided with respect to 
the issue of liability for the return of the vehicle for the 
reasons that: 
a) The Court has ruled that the search of the vehicle 
was improper and unlawful. A copy of the Court's ruling is 
attached hereto/ marked Exhibit A and incorporated herewith. 
b) The pleadings admit that the property was not 
ADDENDUM 5 
proceeded against by the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 58-37-13. 
c) The pleadings admit that the property was converted 
by the State of Utah by delivery or release thereof to agents of 
the United States Government in violation of the mandate of Utah 
State statutes. 
2. No genuine issue of material fact exists with 
regard to the first three causes of action as set out in the 
property-owner's counterclaims for the reason that the search and 
seizure and the disposition or release of said property is 
against law in that UCA 58-37-13 strictly mandates the seizure of 
vehicles and their disposition requiring/ among other things/ 
that: 
a) UCA 58-37-13(4) requires that property taken or 
detained under this section is not repleviable but is "in custody 
of the law enforcement agency making the seizure/ subject only to 
the orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
jurisdiction." 
b) The Act further provides under section (4) thereof 
seised property may be dealt with in one of three following ways; 
that is/ placing the property under seal/ removing the property 
to a place designated by it or the warrant under which it was 
seized/ or to take custody of the property and remove it to an 
appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law. 
3. That the acts of the State of Utah herein were not 
timely done in accordance with the mandate of the applicable 
State law and therefore cannot be sustained at trial. 
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WHEREFORE/ the said Andrew Lewis Taylor prays that his 
property be returned to him and that the matter be set for trial 
on the appropriate measure of damages on all^causes of action. 
Dated this H- b day of May/ 1^88. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE DEFENDANT AND ITS ATTORNEY 0. BRENTON ROWE: 
You will please take notice that defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment will come on for hearing in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court on June 6/ 1988 at the hour of 9:30 A.M./ or as 
soon thereafter as counsel can be heard. 
Of the foregoing you will please take notice and govern 
yourselves accordingly. f( 
Dated this /)& day of May/ 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing was mailed/ postage 
prepaid/ to: 
0* Brenton Rove 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
220 North 200 East 
St. George/ Utah 84770 
David L. Wilkinson 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
, £U 
Dated t h i s rfb day of May/ 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS #0904 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Governmental Affairs Div. 
D. MICHAEL CARTER #4548 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
State of Utah 
Southern Utah State College 
Administration Building, 3rd Floor 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-7738 or 628-1732 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff,. ] 
vs. ] 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE ] 
and $3,300 CASH, ] 
Defendant. ] 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
! SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
1 REQUEST FOR ORAL 
> ARGUMENT AND NOTICE 
) OF HEARING 
) Civil No. 87-1585 
Plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through D. Michael Carter, 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby moves this Court for an Order 
of Partial Summary Judgment on and/or Dismissal of the Counter-
claims filed in this action by Claimant Andrew Lewis Taylor. 
Plaintiff seeks judgment and/or dismissal upon the Defendant's 
prior election of his statutory remedies, the Defendant's failure 
to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and/or the 
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Plaintiff also 
and alternatively seeks judgment and/or dismissal by virtue of the 
ADDENDUM 6 
fact that this is a proceeding in rem which does not contemplate 
the filing of a counterclaim, and/or on grounds of failure to join 
an indispensable"party. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Rules 56 and 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions of U.C.A. Sections 58-
37-13 (1987), 63-30-10(2) (1985), 63-30-11 through 13 (1987), 63-
30-19 (1965), 77-35-12(g) (1953, as amended), 78-16-1, et.seq. 
(1982), the provisions of 21 USC Section 881 (1981), 19 USC 
Sections 1607-9 and State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987). 
The foregoing will be more fully set out in the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities which will be filed in support of this 
Motion. This Motion will be further supported by the Affidavits 
of F. Steven Lough, Jay Averett, and 0. Brenton Rowe. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED t h i s _^rf% day of frfrzrJtiii* 1989 . 
yA^, ^ r V v A — 
D .\SlCHXEiisCARTER 
A s s i s t a n t A ^ o r n e y General 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTERCLAIMANT, AND HIS COUNSEL OF RECORD, MR. J. FRANKLIN 
ALLRED: 
You will please take notice that the Plaintiff intends to call 
on for hearing th<* foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Hon. J. Philip Eves, in his 
courtroom at the Washington County Hall of Justice, 220 North 200 
2 
East, St. George, Utah, on Tuesday, March 14, 1989, at the hour of 
9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, 
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES' ACCORDINGLY 
DATED this V d ? day of *^lfouaA* , 1989. 
DV MICI^AEL\CART'ER 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
Of the foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, REQUEST FOR 
ORAL ARGUMENT, AND NOTICE OF HEARING, first-class postage prepaid 
on this /4& day of ~^^5Au/tsL4 ^ 1989, to'the following: y^ft, 
Mr. J. Franklin Allred, P. C. 
Attorney at Law 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Mr. 0. Brenton Rowe 
Deputy County Attorney 
Hall of Justice 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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IN THE FIFTH D I S T R I C T COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
v. 
Plaintiff, 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE 
$3,300.00 CASH 
Defendant. 
Case No. 87-1585 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
APPEARANCES: 
P l a i n t i f f ( s ) 
Defendant(s) 
TYPE OF CASE: 
SETTLEMENT CHANCES: 
P o o r X 
0. Brenton Rowe, Esq. David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
220 No. 200 East 236 State Capitol 
St. George, UT 84770 Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
J. Franklin All red, Esq. 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Excellent_ 
Unknown: 
Good Fair 
PLEADINGS COMPLETED BY: Now Complete 
DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE: February 1, 1989 
MOTION CUT-OFF DATE: February 15, 1989 
DEADLINE FOR AMENDMENTS: 
OTHER DEADLINES: 
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: CCounsel who wi l l try the case are to be 
present . Clients or an individual with authority to s e t t l e the 
case are also to be present) 
D A T E : _ ^ April 20, 1989 
Washington County Hall of Justice 
PLACE: St. George, UT 
TIME: 9:30 o ' c l o c k a . m. 
A final pre-trial will be held before the Court on Thursday 
the 20th day of April 1989 , at 9:30 o'clock a. m. 
(Counsel who will try the case are to be present). 
STIPULATED PROPOSED PRE-TRIAL ORDER, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, 
REOUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND SPECIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
ARE DUE AT PRE-TRIAL, 
Failure to submit Findings, Conclusions, Request for 
Jury Instructions and Special Voir Dire Questions within the 
time prescribed will result in the Court rejecting the late 
filing or non-filing items, and the Court will deem them to 
have been waived and will accept the complying party's documents 
only, 
TRIAL DATE: TUESDAY, MAY 9th, 1989 
TIME: 1:30 o'clock p. m. 
PLACE: Washington Co. Hall of Justice, St. George, UT 
TRIAL BRIEFS ARE DUE TWO WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF TRIAL DATE. 
TRIAL: Anticipated Length: h day ; Jury ; Non-JuryJX . 
(Jury fee to be paid five days from date of this Order 
or jury shall be waived). 
OTHER MATTERS: 
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings 
and will not be modified without Court Order and then only upon 
a showing of manifest injustice. 
DATED this ^3^- day of December , 19 88 . 
J. /titLIP EVES/7 
DISTRICT COURT/JUDGE 
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to counsel 
at the addresses indicated above. 
Paul F. Graf #1229 
Washington County Attorney 
0. Brenton Rowe #2815 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Hall of Justice 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ONE 1983 OLDSMOBILE ROYALE, 
$3,300.00 CASH 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. 87-1585 
TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, AND THE DEFENDANT, D. 
MICHAEL CARTER AND J. FRANKLIN ALLRED: 
Pursuant to an Order of Judge J. Philip Eves given on the 
14th day of March, 1989, the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Request for Oral Argument and Notice of Hearing will be 
held on the 20th day of April, 1989. 
Itf-DATED this / *V day of March, 1989, 
O. BRENTON ROWE 
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THE COURT: No. 4, State of Utah versus One 1983 
Oldsmobile, 
MR. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. Michael Carter 
appearing for the State. 
MR. ALLRED: J. Franklin Allred appearing for the 
Counterclaimant and owner of the Oldsmobile. 
May I say it's good to see Your Honor. It's 
been a number of years. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ifve read this file. Rather 
interesting. There's a motion here for summary judgment 
on behalf of the State — 
MR. CARTER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: — on the grounds, as I understand it, 
one, that there's not a proper Counterclaim filed on 
account of the individual is not a defendant named in 
here. 
MR. CARTER: That's our position. 
THE COURT: And therefore could not counterclaim. 
It's never been interpled as a party. 
MR. CARTER: That's our position, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What about that, Mr. Allred? 
MR. ALLRED: Well, Your Honor, I think when they 
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commence an action in res against the vehicle and the 
cash, they in essence commence it against the owner. And 
I think that under the rules of procedure, that he can 
bring in a Counterclaim along with the others. 
The first cause of action in the Counterclaim, 
you'll note, is basically a defense to their claim, that 
says you unlawfully took the automobile and the cash, and 
we want it back. The second one is a — is a claim of 
violation of statute in handling the automobile. The 
third is a claim for breach of a constructive trust in 
handling the automobile and the cash. And the last is 
the Fourth Amendment claim. 
But certainly the issues that allow the State 
to proceed ought in fairness and under the rules allow 
the individual whose property is being taken to make his 
claims back in connection with that property. 
THE COURT: Well, isn't that — as I read those 
cases, don't the cases hold that with an in rem action, 
you have to file an interpleader then if you want him to 
be a party? And you haven't done that, have you? 
MR. ALLRED: There has not been an interpleader 
filed. 
THE COURT: Isn't that the situation you should 
really have? Because he's not — he's not a main party 
to it. And by bringing an in rem action, it doesn't 
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automatically bring him into the lawsuit, does it? 
MR. ALLRED: Well, I think since they served him with 
their pleadings to take away or forfeit the vehicle and 
the cash, yes, he's in the lawsuit. Who else is going to 
defend? I mean the cash can't speak, and the car can't 
speak. 
THE COURT: Well, he should file an interpleader. 
MR. ALLRED: He answers and says, "I want the money 
back." 
THE COURT: He didn't file an interpleader. 
MR* ALLRED: And —• well, under the forfeiture 
statutes, you're required to give notice to the owner of 
the property. He's the owner of the property. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. ALLRED: And I don't think he has to file an 
interpleader to get his property back. Otherwise, the 
proceeding is a nullity. 
You're saying the State can say, "We're going 
to forfeit your car, and you can't come in and say why it 
shouldn't be forfeited." 
THE COURT: What about their claim that this has been 
forfeited under the federal statute, and therefore, this 
is res judicata on this particular matter? 
MR. ALLRED: That's an interesting claim. If I 
may — may I take a moment, Your Honor, and point out to 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
the Court what occurred here? 
This vehicle was stopped out here on the 
highway, and a search was conducted and contraband was 
seized. Subsequently, as it turns out, the Utah Highway 
Patrol agents who seized the contraband, cash, and the 
automobile turned the latter to the — the cash and the 
automobile — over to agents of the federal government. 
And we have cited in the pleadings the 
appropriate statute and the appropriate handling for 
seized items under the state law. There is nowhere in 
the law that says these items can be turned over to 
another agency. They're to be held by the appropriate 
officers, subject to two things. One, the orders of this 
Court — that's Washington County District Court — and 
the orders of the officer seizing it or the person who 
has the custody. They have to be held subject to this 
jurisdiction. They may not be given away. And I'll get 
to the question the Court asks. 
Subsequently, Judge Eves determines that that 
stop and that seizure of the contraband was unlawful; 
ergo, can you have a lawful seizure of the car and the 
cash? That's the real question that is before the Court. 
THE COURT: That's an interesting question, I agree 
with you. 
MR. ALLRED: Maybe some of the other-claims — Fourth 
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the cash and the vehicle is still there. He's saying 
that the contraband was unlawfully seized. The illegal 
material was taken and found to be illegally taken. The 
lawfully-held vehicle and cash, therefore, have to be 
unlawfully taken and must be returned• 
Now, as a defense, can the State say — can the 
State walk away — and letf s take the contraband out for 
a moment. Let's say they stopped a motorist on a highway 
down there; took his vehicle and the cash that he had and 
then moved to forfeit it. And when he answered and said, 
"You know, I was just driving back to Salt Lake City, and 
the police stopped me, and they took my car and my cash, 
and I want it back," they said, "We didn't keep your cash 
and your car in accordance with the law governing the 
seizure of it." 
And the law establishes the parameters in which 
it may be taken. It's seized, and it's held by the 
officers, subject to the orders of Your Honor and Your 
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Honor exclusively. 
Then they come back to the Court now to Your 
Honor and say, "Well, well, well, we didn't do, Your 
Honor, what the statute obligated us to do. We let that 
property go. Now, as a matter of fact, to receive the 
exact property back, it might not be possible because it 
has gone where we know not. We gave it away. We 
violated" — one of the claims in here is constructive 
trust. "We violated Section 77-38(b)" — I believe it 
is — "which says seizures are to be undertaken, and we 
gave the property to the federal government." They 
published notice, they tell us in their pleadings, in 
"U.S.A. Today" and also sent a notice, "and therefore, 
we're absolved of any claim for what we've done." 
THE COURT: Let me stop you there for just a second, 
Mr. Allred. 
Perhaps you're right. Perhaps you're right on 
that whole thing. Let's assume that scenario, for the 
moment. But the thing that bothers me in reading the 
cases they've cited — I don't know whether you have 
anything to the contrary. But reading the cases to the 
contrary, the State is saying, "We want to take the 
action of claiming this Oldsmobile and cash and so 
forth." Now, that's what they filed this action to do. 
MR. ALLRED: That's correct. 
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MR. CARTER: Mr. Taylor, Your Honor. 
MR. ALLRED: Mr. Taylor. 
THE COURT: What is it? 
MR. CARTER: Mr. Taylor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Taylor. So it couldn't be used in 
that case. 
Now, the question I have for you, though, 
Mr. Allred, is Mr. Taylor may well have a legitimate 
lawsuit against the State of Utah for wrongfully taking 
his property. But I don't think that rises in this 
case. They're saying this ought to be dismissed in this 
case because the State hasn't got any property they can 
seek a forfeiture on. It — they gave it up. They don't 
have it. It's not in their possession. 
Now, if they've wrongfully taken possession of 
it, isn't that a lawsuit that Mr. Taylor has? And if it 
is, then Mr. Taylor has to bring the action. Because 
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hefs not a party to this. And just the fact that he was 
the owner does not make him a party for the purpose of 
filing a counterclaim. 
MR. ALLRED: I appreciate what the Court is saying, 
but if there isn't some way to resist their petition in 
the context of how it occurred — they said in the 
pleadings filed by Mr. Rowe, "We're going to forfeit the 
Oldsmobile, and we're going to forfeit the cash." 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. ALLRED: I posit this question. Isn't there some 
way for the owner of the Oldsmobile and the cash to 
resist that? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. ALLRED: And that's what he has done, at least in 
one of these claims. 
THE COURT: No, no. He hasn't done it. He files an 
interpleader and says, "I'm the guy that owns that." It 
might not have been Mr. Taylor, it might have been 
Mr. Joe Jones or somebody who says, "I was the one that 
owned that, and I can file an interpleader and claim the 
title to that." That's the purpose of that action. 
It seems to me that this action ought to be 
dismissed, period. Because the County has no further 
claim on it and didn't have any claim on it, and the 
State says it's been — or the DEA or DA — whatever it 
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was. 
MR, CARTER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And so whatever claim the State of Utah 
had in attempting to forfeit that automobile taken under 
their alleged claim of illegal use of it, they're out of 
the picture. It ought to be dismissed. And if you have 
an action, you have a separate suit you need to file. 
Isn't that the position of it? 
MR. CARTER: That certainly is the position we take. 
MR. ALLRED: Obviously that's the position he wants 
to take. I — I would urge on Your Honor that when they 
commence a forfeiture proceeding, they have to move 
forward and show why they can forfeit it. And he can — 
and we can come in and show at trial why they ought not 
be able to forfeit it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Allred — 
MR. ALLRED: They're the moving party. 
THE COURT: — how does Mr. Taylor become a party to 
this lawsuit when he is not named anyplace in the 
plaintiff's action as — 
MR. ALLRED: He is served in the lawsuit, Your 
Honor. That's how — 
THE COURT: If you're served as an officer of the 
corporation, does that make you liable as an individual? 
MR. ALLRED: Well, no. But he has notice of the 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR, RPR 
11 
lawsuit, and they1re saying, "We're going to take this 
property from you." 
THE COURT: Fine. That's exactly my point. He has 
notice that somebody is claiming this car. Now he has — 
if he has a claim on it, he says, f,Ifm coming in. I want 
my name put on that lawsuit as an interpleader, and I 
want that car." 
Isn't that the procedure? Do you have any case 
that says he can do it by simply filing an in rem action, 
and he can come in? 
MR. ALLRED: I — well, there aren't any Utah cases, 
certainly, either way on this point. 
THE COURT: They cited some cases that show that you 
can't do it. That Arizona case, particularly, as I 
recall — isn't that the one? Whichever — I don't 
remember the name. 
MR. CARTER: A case that comes to my mind, Your 
Honor, is a federal case. U.S. versus The — I think 
it's a 380 SEL Mercedes Benz. 
THE COURT: Whichever one it was, I remember it's in 
the memorandum you filed that said an individual owner 
isn't automatically made a party to it by the filing of 
the suit against the in rem action. 
MR. ALLRED: Well, as I say, there is no Utah case on 
that point. The Utah statute says specifically how the 
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forfeiture is to proceed, and they give notice to the 
owner. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ALLRED: And they did so in this case. And the 
owner answered and put the matter at issue and said, "You 
can't take the car because you seized it unlawfully.11 
And I — I'm loath to concede that, but I certainly 
understand the way the Court is thinking in this, that 
the pleading is styled incorrectly. 
And if the Court would give us the appropriate 
time — like two days — we'll file an interpleader. I 
hate to see the whole thing lost, and I feel that 
injustice would be done. 
THE COURT: Why would it? Wouldn't your man have his 
cause of action? If he has a cause of action, you 
haven't lost that. I'm not going to rule on that. I'll 
make it specific here. I'm not ruling on his cause of 
action. And specifically if he's not a party to this 
action by reason of an interpleader, I can't rule on his 
position. 
MR. ALLRED: Well, what the Court could do is allow 
us to interplead at this juncture, if you're saying the 
pleadings are wrong. In any other civil action, it would 
be allowed, I would think. If you're getting to the 
point where you're talking about the trial, etc., and the 
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THE COURT: I think that ~ 
MR. ALLRED: So at the very minimum, I donft 
believe — I would hope to urge on the Court — 
respectfully urge on the Court — they brought an 
affirmative action. "We're taking your vehicle." And 
they have an obligation of proving the legality of the 
seizure as against the owner, who without any pleading at 
all, I suggest to the Court, could come in here before 
the Court and say, "Here's why they can't take this car. 
Here's why they can't proceed." 
So if we've designated the counterclaim or any 
of the four counterclaims incorrectly, it may be that 
some of those should be sheared off. 
But I suggest that without any response 
whatsoever — correct nomenclature or not — the owner of 
the property, since he's received notice, can come before 
the Court and tell the Court why they may not have an 
affirmative relief on their claim to forfeit. The reason 
why is it was unlawfully seized. 
THE COURT: You admit that the State apparently has 
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no further claim on the car or didn't shortly after they 
took possession of it? Am I correct on that? 
MR. ALLRED: I would have to agree with the facts 
that say they gave the cash and the vehicle to a third 
party, yes. 
THE COURT: And so the State would not be able to 
proceed with its claim of forfeiture because it doesn't 
have the "rem" to claim the forfeiture on; isn't that 
correct? 
MR. CARTER: That is correct, Your Honor. Well, it 
is correct in the context of the suit. 
THE COURT: Yeah. In the suit. 
MR. CARTER: Yes. 
MR. ALLRED: They need the forfeiture to ratify what 
they improperly did. 
And what happened is that they brought the 
action, I guess, not knowing that the forfeiture had gone 
on, or to forfeit it legally to correct what they, the 
State, improperly did. That was give it away. 
And we're saying, "You cannot forfeit it 
legally, for the reason that you didn't seize it 
legally." And that's where the second cause of action 
comes in as constructive trust. 
And I think if — if you dismiss their claim — 
and I don't think they've moved to dismiss their own 
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claim. The claim was there, and I believe that the owner 
can come in with or without a counterclaim — if I've 
improperly filed the counterclaims, the owner can come in 
and say, "Here's why they can't have the affirmative 
relief" and pose that legal issue without ever 
responding. 
But at a minimum, if the Court says the Arizona 
case applies under the Utah statute and that interpleader 
ought to be there, then I think you should give the 
Oldsmobile and the cash five days to file an 
interpleader — or the true owner five days to file an 
interpleader if the case — 
THE COURT: What about that, Counsel? 
MR. CARTER: Well, Your Honor, the position we take 
relative to the interpleader is that at the time that the 
forfeiture action at issue here was filed, Mr. Taylor's 
complete and entire interests had been terminated four 
months earlier by federal action. We don't believe he 
has a claim or an interest in this property in order to 
file a counterclaim interpleader or any related claim of 
interest in the present suit because his interests had 
been earlier terminated and cut off by federal action. 
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me we're waltzing 
around the mulberry bush and coming to the same place. 
Because if you file an interpleader, you're getting right 
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back to filing the same as if you'd filed a lawsuit. 
MR. CARTER: Well, I want to take the Court back one 
step. There is a motion in the file whereby the State 
has asked — has asked that his action be dismissed. I 
believe that that was heard. I'm unaware of any order 
ever proceeding from that hearing, and we would take the 
position that the matter is open for complete dismissal, 
and we would urge that upon the Court this morning. 
THE COURT: Is that the one that Judge Burns ruled 
on? 
MR. CARTER: No. Thatf s one that Judge Eves, I 
believe, ruled on. 
MR. ALLRED: I don't believe it was ruled an, Your 
Honor. But certainly they can't, after responsive 
pleadings — whether they're improperly titled or not, 
they can't simply move to dismiss. 
My recollection would be that Mr. Rowe and 
Judge Eves — and I spoke about that — that the Court 
was impressed with the fact that someone from the 
Attorney General's office was not involved in this 
lawsuit. 
I sent them a notice of claim back in 1987, 
registered mail. I have served all the pleadings in the 
case on the Attorney General's office, as well as 
Mr. Rowe. We never got any answer from them. Finally 
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after a certificate of readiness for trial was filed in 
this case, counsel shows up. And I have spoken with the 
Court and didn't mean to waive the — our motion to 
strike the overly long memo, etc., but thatfs a 
technicality that the Court can deal with. 
What's at issue here is whether or not this 
claim is going to be irrevocably lost because of what 
counsel says here is a defense, I suppose, to a claim now 
by Mr. Taylor. If we file a lawsuit, they say, "Listen, 
you don't have a claim against us. Your rights were 
forfeited in the federal action." 
Well, all of that is now before this Court. If 
itfs improperly pled, all I'm saying is that a few days 
to clean those pleadings still leaves us with these 
issues. One, can they seize property legally if the stop 
was unlawful? And, two, can they absolve themselves of 
liability by turning it over to the federal government? 
And I think this Court could rule on that as a matter of 
law and then take such other further necessary steps 
as — in establishing factual issues of damage if its 
rule is affirmatively. And we can clean the pleadings so 
the Court can do that. 
THE COURT: I understand your position, and I'm 
certainly not ruling — let's make it very, very clear — 
on whether or not that your claim is valid or invalid. 
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You understand what I'm saying, that that's not before 
me. Your motion is for summary judgment, as I recall. 
MR. CARTER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But I don't think I can rule on summary 
judgment -— well, if I rule on summary judgment, that may 
in effect be res judicata on Mr. Allred's claim — if I 
were to rule that he had to file a separate claim and 
dismiss his counterclaim in this case — against his 
client. I don't want to jeopardize his client. I think 
each party ought to have a — a fair shake of the dice 
here. 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, with respect to that, again, 
I reiterate the fact that there were federal proceedings 
held in this matter. The notices that were given in that 
context were appropriate under federal law. There was no 
response. That would have been, in my opinion, the 
proper opportunity for Mr. Taylor to assert his interest 
in the automobile and to prevent the forfeiture from 
already having taken place. 
THE COURT: But if that's true — and assume it's 
true, for the moment — if that's true, does that say 
that the State has made a legitimate action in taking 
possession of this car under a forfeiture Statute? If 
they're in error on that, how does it absolve the State 
from liability if the federal government has already made 
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a forfeiture? 
MR. CARTER: I don't mean to suggest that it absolves 
the State, Your Honor. Irm suggesting that the defense 
of improper taking would have been more properly asserted 
when the forfeiture proceeding was extant within the 
federal guidelines. By failing to appear in that federal 
action; by failing to assert that defense or any other 
available defense in that earlier proceeding, it — it's 
our position that Mr. Taylor has thereby waived those 
defenses of improper taking or so forth, or that he's 
failed to timely file them. And those interests that he 
may then have asserted have been terminated through the 
federal action. 
We don't believe that his interest is any 
longer. We believe that it was terminated by federal 
action, and that — that the case before this Court was 
untimely and superfluous and shouldn't have been filed at 
all. It was a matter of miscommunication and mistake. 
THE COURT: Well, that doesn't — that doesn't 
justify summary judgment. 
MR. CARTER: Well, the point we're asking, Your 
Honor, is that the counterclaims be dismissed because 
Mr. Taylor has no interest upon which to base them. 
He's, as you point out, not a party to this action, and 
that once the — we see that in terms of a sequence. If 
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the counterclaims are dismissed, then we stand in the 
context of a Complaint and Answer. We would then ask the 
Court to dismiss the Complaints as having been improperly 
filed. We have no interest —- we have no need to forfeit 
the car, and there's no point in going forward with the 
thing because it's already been done and stands ais res 
judicata four months earlier. 
THE COURT: Mr. Rowe, you filed this action. Do you 
want it dismissed? 
MR. ROWE: Yes, Your Honor. That's ~ basically I 
was unaware of any federal forfeiture proceedings. And 
that's the miscommunication. Had I been aware, 1 never 
would have filed the lawsuit. In fact, I wasn't aware 
that the federal authorities were even going to be 
involved when the controlled substances were located. 
I found out after I'd filed charges in the 
criminal action that was ultimately suppressed, that — 
about 10 days later — that all my physical evidence had 
gone to the federal authorities, and my expert who 
analyzed the substance was in San Francisco. And from 
then on, it was just a matter of not knowing what they'd 
done with the car or the money. And it wasn't until 
after I filed the forfeiture action, that I learned that 
the federal authorities had also taken the car and the 
money. And that's why I filed it because I felt that the 
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State still had it in their possession because it was 
state agents that initially came to me as a result of the 
roadblock and the seizure of the vehicle requesting for 
charges to be filed. 
Had I known that the substance had gone to the 
federal authorities, I!d have asked them to have 
prosecuted any criminal action and — rather than do it 
piecemeal here. And when I learned that the federal 
authorities had forfeited it, I had no longer any 
interest in the property. 
So at least as to the State's claim on the 
money and the vehicle, I would move to dismiss that, 
THE COURT: Mr. Allred, how would Mr. — 
MR. ALLRED: Judge? 
THE COURT: Excuse me. Did somebody have something? 
MR. ALLRED: I was just going to say I have a 
response. 
The problem arises here, Your Honor — if we're 
allowed to as I say clean up our pleading to the action, 
58-37-13 does not give the agents who seize a vehicle or 
money or anything any authority to turn those over to the 
federal government. 
THE COURT: Fine. 
MR. ALLRED: So the violation of law is — 
THE COURT: That may be. 
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MR. ALLRED: Is what — that's created the problem on 
the State. 
THE COURT: But I'm not ruling on that. 
MR. ALLRED: I understand that. We're not to that 
point. But if we get the pleading properly before the 
Court, we end up, no matter where we go, in the same 
posture. A, was the vehicle and the cash illegally 
taken? B, if so, does the fact that the federal 
government forfeit them preclude this lawsuit? And 
that's what we're trying to get to. 
And I'm saying if the Court would give us some 
time to clean up the pleadings satisfactorily, we do get 
those two issues resolved. 
THE COURT: It seems to me the cleaner way of doing 
it —• if there's such a term as that — the best way to 
do that is Mr. Taylor files a suit. He may want to sue 
the federal government as well as the State and say these 
are the things that they did wrong, and that would remove 
this question of the State's claim on it right now, which 
apparently the State doesn't have and didn't have. 
Wouldn't you be in a better position to do 
that? 
MR. ALLRED: No. I don't think so. Your Honor, the 
time has passed and other defenses arise. 
THE COURT: Why would you be prejudiced? 
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MR. ALLRED: We're certainly prejudiced any time 
we've almost got this thing to trial. It's set for trial 
on May 10. We're almost there. We have the issues 
before the Court. So it's now like a board game. Well, 
now you're going to go back to square one and file an 
action in the federal court and file an action in the 
state court and serve notice and wait for the time to run 
against the Attorney General again. 
THE COURT: If you file an interpleader, you're not 
going to have a trial on May 9, are you? 
MR. ALLRED: Well, no. And I don't think we're going 
to have any trial in any event, Your Honor, except to 
perhaps damages. That is, the value of the automobile 
during the time it was wrongfully deprived — it's use 
was wrongfully deprived the owner and the value — the 
market value of the cash that was taken. If we prevail. 
THE COURT: Gee, that shouldn't be hard to establish. 
MR. ALLRED: It shouldn't be hard to establish if we 
prevail. So we need a "yes" on the Answer. And if the 
vehicle was illegally taken and the cash, we need a "yes" 
there. And when they gave the property to the federal 
government, did that absolve the State of 
responsibility? We need a "yes" or a "no." If that's 
determined against us either way, as a matter of law, 
there's no fact. As a matter of law, then, our case is 
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concluded. So ~ 
THE COURT: You mean you're going to — those are the 
only two issues you're going to rely on? 
MR. ALLRED: I believe those are the issues that are 
raised. 
THE COURT: You raised others in your counterclaim. 
MR. ALLRED: Well, if the — if the — those issues 
are answered against us in either place, the counterclaim 
dies. Because the constructive trust isn't there; the 
Fourth Amendment violation isn!t there. Those two 
answers are the bases for which all the counterclaims 
derive. If there was a — if you can lawfully seize a 
vehicle, even though you've unlawfully seized the 
contraband — and that takes a leap of faith, I think — 
if they say, "Well, the seizure" — or "the forfeiture 
was lawful nevertheless," all the claims die. Or if they 
say, "Well, since the State, instead of keeping its trust 
as required by 58-37-13, gave the property to some third 
party and didn't hold it subject to the order of this 
Court, nevertheless that's all right," all our claims die 
again. They're all dependent on the answers to those two 
questions. And I think that this Court could rule on 
that if it would allow us to file an interpleader. 
I can't get back today to do it, but I can have 
an interpleader in next week. And then the trial date 
i 
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can be either vacated while we have a subsequent hearing 
on these issues or set it another time. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, I'm frankly more inclined to 
agree with the Court's view on this. Because I don't 
think an interpleader of its own right is the — the 
complete cure for what counsel urges. 
I would point out to the Court the need for — 
the DEA is an indispensable party in this action. 
Clearly they've undertaken to deal in terms of whether or 
not Mr. Allred has an interest in this property. And I 
don't think that this is merely an issue between the 
State and Mr. Allred. I think Mr. Allred — or excuse 
me. Mr. Taylor. I beg your pardon. Clearly Mr. Taylor 
was dealt with by both the State and federal agencies, 
okay? I think —• I think the urgence that only the State 
was involved in the seizure is a bit misconstrued there 
because the DEA was involved in this case from day one. 
They were not involved in the original seizure, however. 
There's evident suspicion, at least, that 
Mr. Taylor was involved in violation of not only state, 
but federal law. The cooperative elements between state 
and federal governments there came into play, and all of 
this argument about constructive trust and the taking 
entity and so forth I think is very fairly viewed by 
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virtue of the fact that there was -- there was co-equal 
jurisdiction; there was a joint act between state and 
federal authorities. Decisions were made among those 
people that were immediate, and the federal government 
took possession of this vehicle and the money on the day 
of its seizure by the highway patrol. I should think 
that that's not uncommon, and I donft think in that 
statute, there1s any prohibition against any cooperative 
element. 
In fact, if only by analogy — because it 
doesn't speak to disposition of the property — but 58 — 
58-13-12, the statute just preceding the forfeiture 
statute, shows strong indication that there should be 
interagency cooperation on these matters to the total 
end; that the drug problem is thereby negated. It does 
not speak to the property. It speaks generally in terms 
of cooperation between records and so forth. But I think 
it clearly suggests the opportunity for interagency 
cooperation on matters, and there1s no question but what 
there could have just as easily been a violation of 
federal law in this case as there might have been 
collateral issues of violations of state law. 
I donft think the seizure by the Utah Highway 
Patrol is the necessary immediate focus. The federal 
agents were just as involved. In fact more involved as 
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you consider the time frame of the thing and the actual 
forfeiture that was undertaken. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Allred? 
MR. ALLRED: If I may speak briefly to that. It may 
be that as the defendant, they have a third-party claim 
against the drug enforcement agency and would want to 
assert that. That's another matter of pleading. But 
it's not necessary for us asserting the counterclaims to 
bring that party in. 
That defense is still available to them. If 
the Court rules they gave it away and that suffices, then 
they're out on that theory. The State is absolved from 
liability. If the Court says, "Well, Mr. Allred, you 
failed to serve the drug enforcement agency, and 
therefore, you lose in this claim," we'll accept that. 
But may I read to the Court under 58-37-13 (4), 
where it says: "Property taken or detained under this 
section is not repleviable but shall be deemed to be in 
the custody of the law enforcement agency making the 
seizure subject only to the orders and decrees of the 
Court or the official having jurisdiction. Whenever 
property is seized under the provisions of this act, the 
appropriate person or agency may place the property under 
seal, remove the property to a place designated by it or 
the warrant under which it was seized, and/or take 
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custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate 
location for disposition in accordance with law." 
And this is the law that could govern the 
disposition of that property. And it does not say 
anything about interagency cooperation, or that they may 
release that property to a third party, whether itfs a 
federal agency or a — another state agency. It was 
seized by the law enforcement authorities — now, the way 
I read their facts and the way I recall it, Your Honor, 
the Utah Highway Patrol took all the property. They 
brought it here to St. George, stored it under seal, I 
suppose, of the property authority, and somehow it 
appears the federal government came down — and I hope I 
don't misuse the term — muscled in and took the 
property. But their responsibility — the highway 
patrol1s responsibility was to hold it until Your Honor 
or a person of your same competent authority said, 
"Here's what you do with the property." 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. ALLRED: That's what we hope to raise. And if 
the Court will give us the time to re-plead it, I think 
in fairness to the owner of the vehicle and in fairness 
to all parties, if we put it in a proper pleading 
prospective and then have those two issues ruled on by 
the Court as a matter of law, that would be the easiest 
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most effective and fairest way to resolve the case. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. I would suggest to the 
Court that counsel's reading of the statute there is much 
too constrained to have the property dealt with and 
disposed according to — in accordance with law. He 
would suggest that that cannot accrue under federal law. 
Also the suggestion would be that once the highway patrol 
is the agency, that they're the only agency that can deal 
with this. I think that's far too constrained. Because 
as the Court may have noted from the pleadings, 
immediately after the highway patrol became involved and 
in recognizing that there may be a narcotics violation, 
they called in a separate state agency, the Bureau of 
Alcohol and Narcotics — whatever it is specifically — 
but they called in that agency. 
THE COURT: But that all gets down to a question of 
who's — who's doing the right thing here and that sort 
of thing. That isn't an issue before me right now. I — 
MR. CARTER: Well, I suppose that's the case. But to 
the extent that the argument is being made, I feel 
somewhat compelled to try to make any clarification that 
might be helpful. 
It's our position that there was an interagency 
cooperative element operating here, and that due to 
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circumstances and decisions within those agency 
relationships, the federal government took control of 
this property, and they have dealt with it. They have 
terminated Mr. Taylorfs interests. He has no interest to 
assert at this time in this proceeding, having failed to 
do that in federal court. 
We feel that this proceeding is simply filed as 
a result of a mistaken communication, and as the Court 
suggested earlier, the whole thing should be dismissed 
this morning. And if Mr. Taylor feels that he has a 
collateral lawsuit against the state or federal agencies, 
by all means he should consult counsel and pursxie that if 
he deems it appropriate. But we donft think he1(s either 
a party or an interest holder in this case, and we simply 
wish to do away with the matter and let the chips 
subsequently fall where they may. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. It's my opinion that this 
case should be dismissed. I'm going to dismiss the case 
and — without prejudice in any fashion whatsoever as to 
Mr. Taylor's claim that Mr. Taylor may want to file — 
may or may not want to file in a separate action. But I 
think that he's not a party before this action under the 
circumstances. I!11 dismiss the petition and the 
counterclaim. 
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MR, CARTER: Thank you, Your Honor. With the Court's 
instruction, would you direct that a pleading be created 
to that effect? May I offer to do that? 
THE COURT: File an order of dismissal, yes — 
MRc CARTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: — in accordance with my ruling here. 
MR. CARTER: Thank you. 
MR. ALLRED: That should specifically say "without 
prejudice." 
THE COURT: Without prejudice. 
MR. CARTER: By all means. 
THE COURT: Any claim of Mr. Taylor's. 
MR. CARTER: By all means. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter were concluded.) 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days 
after the service of the summons is complete unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a 
cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days after the 
service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the 
answer within 20 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by 
the court, within 20 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise 
directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as 
follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days 
after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) — (7) 
in Subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and 
the motion for judgment mentioned in Subdivision (c) of this rule shall be 
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
35 
ADDENDUM 10 
Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after 
notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court 
may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order 
as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in Subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Compiler's Notes. — Except for minor vari- Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
ations, this rule follows Rule 12, F.R.C.P. Rule 7. 
36 
ADDENDUM 1 1 
Rule 13 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah (Utah 1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of P.2d 612 (Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr. 
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d Ct. App. 1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 
57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 
Life Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P.2d
 P j 2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rothey v. 
924(1968);Lewisv.Porter;548;P2d496(Utah
 W a l k e r B a n k & T r u g t c 7 5 4 R 2 d i 2 2 2 
S ; ^ f T r % ? * * ? 6 1 9 i Pc2oda6o7oiU^o < U t ^ 1988); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First 
m ^ £ S ? r C l t y C°rUnCl1, *2L P ' S III ^ ^ Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). (Utah 1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 ' 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 38, federal courts on motion for summary judg-
43 to 45; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et ment or for judgment on the pleadings, 1 
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237, A.L.R. Fed. 295. 
280, 389 et seq. What, other than affidavits, constitutes 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136, "matters outside the pleadings," which may 
138, 143, 144, 162 et seq., 173; 27 CJ.S. Dis- convert motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
missal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 CJ.S. Pleading Procedure 12(b), (c) into motion for summary 
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to judgment, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 1027. 
268, 424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 
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Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against 
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its abju-
dication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action 
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by 
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on 
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or 
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may 
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the 
pleading of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which 
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supple-
mental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
§ 188 et seq. A.L.R.4th 338. 
C.J.S. — 67 CJ.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. Key Numbers. — Parties <t=» 49 to 56. 
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
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